Simulations of acceptance auction for the allocation of radio spectrum of the 600 MHz band

Angélica Gutiérrez Guerrero, Damián Emilio Gibaja Romero, María Catalina Ovando Chico


Since 1989, auctions have been the most used mechanism to allocate radio spectrum; however, there are scenarios that have allowed this allocation mechanism not to be as efficient as expected, such as not setting limit prices, collision between participants and exposure risks, making spectrum distribution inefficient. On the other hand, the auction of deferred acceptance allows preserving the privacy of the winners, to incorporate budgetary restrictions, allowing results that are more efficient in the allocation. Therefore, the main objective of this article is analyze two spectrum allocation scenarios using the deferred acceptance algorithm, for the 600 MHz band. For the development of the simulation of the auction, the programming language R was used as a tool and data from the OCDE (Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos, by its acronym in Spanish) were considered for price estimation. Finally, the results verify the characteristics of the auction and the trend on the behavior of the participants. It is shown that the deferred acceptance auction allows to assign the radio spectrum of the 600 MHz band to the participants that give it more value and have the firm decision to participate until the end of it.


Radioelectric spectrum, Deferred Acceptance Clock (DAA), allocation mechanisms

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